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andras // User Search
andras // User SearchSDK Developers : Pissed OffJun 19, 2006, 6:42pm
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> After discussion with the Devteam, they have agreed to reinstate the "box"
> method versus the "Sphere" method for the visual view. The change should be > in effect later today. > > May the scavenger hunt continue :-) > > Cryonics > Thank you! That was a really generous solution by the company! -- Andras "It's MY computer" (tm Steve Gibson) NewsGroup HickupsJun 20, 2006, 7:19pm
Hi Folks,
I just wanted to warn you the newsgroup will have a few hiccups while the transition to the 4.1 universe is made for the authentication. I'll try my best to minimize those mishaps! Thanks for your understanding, -- Andras "It's MY computer" (tm Steve Gibson) NewsGroup HickupsJun 21, 2006, 6:00pm
The new authentication is in place so new AW members can access the newsgroups too :)
Beta testers please wait at least until Friday to get access to the Beta group! Thank you for you patience, [View Quote] Follow Up set to Community ng -- Andras "It's MY computer" (tm Steve Gibson) Minimum Visibility = 200mJul 28, 2006, 8:00am
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> As crazy as it may sound for some, I believe I should have the right, as a
> world owner, to set the minimum visibility to 200m. > Using the Admin tool: Make an attribute dump of your world, edit the atdump.txt file. Item 72 is the min visibility - change it to 200. Load the attribute back to your world. -- Andras "It's MY computer" (tm Steve Gibson) Minimum Visibility = 200mAug 2, 2006, 10:00am
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> Less than a 1% chance that they will ever use your code.
> And for the record - I'm not implying its a bad code. :) > Thanks god! Otherwise they had to debug his code forever :) -- Andras "It's MY computer" (tm Steve Gibson) Minimum Visibility = 200mAug 2, 2006, 7:33pm
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> One of these days I really will have to see about writing my own set of AW
> like technologies and free myself from these bad descisions,... > Waiting for "one of those days" :) -- Andras "It's MY computer" (tm Steve Gibson) charter??Jun 23, 2001, 5:32pm
Do you really have that address at here.com? Because if not - you better change it before you will be reported for abuse to your ISP.
Andras FYI: From the Munging FAQ: >http://www.faqs.org/faqs/net-abuse-faq/munging-address/ 4d. How should I NOT mung my address? (AOLers! Be sure to read Section 5, "Instructions for AOL members") - IMPORTANT! Do not make up domain names! Most of them actually exist, and your fakery could cause them a lot of woe. Certain domains are already virtually useless because of folks using them in mungs and forgeries. Plus, new domain names are being added all the time, and you never know if someone might want to use your mung; your actions today -do- have an effect on the future! It is almost as harmful to add something directly after the at sign, and doing so may not prevent the delivery of messages anyway. DON'T: yourname at NOSPAM.your-isp.com DON'T: yourname at REMOVE-THIS.com DON'T: yourname at your-isp.ORG (instead of COM) DO: yourname at your-isp.INVALID (Use -only- .INVALID to do this!) - Do not use a totally faked address, especially one that looks real. DON'T: not-your-real-name at some-other-isp.com [View Quote] Pie....Jun 23, 2001, 5:23pm
Nuns [C&C]Jul 8, 2001, 10:00pm
Nuns you've gotta Love them...
There were some guys sitting behind a couple of nuns at a football game. The men decided to badger the nuns, to get them to move. So the first one says to the others (loud enough for the women ahead to hear), "I think I want to move to Utah, there are only 100 Catholics living there..." The second guy speaks up and says, "I want to go to Montana, there are only 50 Catholics living there..." The third guy speaks up and says, "I want to go to Idaho, there are only 25 Catholics living there..." One of the nuns turns around and looks the third guy in the eye and calmly says, "Why don't you go to hell, there aren't any Catholics there." [3.1 non-beta] bug reportJul 9, 2001, 10:51am
[Fwd: Complete Analysis of CodeRedII]Aug 7, 2001, 3:33pm
Everyone who is running IIS4 or higher on W2K or NT4 probably interested to read this article.
600,000 server infected so far :( Andras -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Complete Analysis of CodeRedII Date: Mon, 6 Aug 2001 00:39:07 -0700 From: Steve Gibson <support at grc.com> Newsgroups: grc.news,grc.news.feedback Followup-To: grc.news.feedback Folks, Here's the clearest and most complete analysis I've seen so far. ------------------------------------------------------------------- Code Red II Worm Analysis Update ================================= The new worm that was first noticed yesterday has been analyzed. Here is a summary of the facts based on the excellent analyses referenced at the bottom of this page. EXPLOITED VULNERABILITY ------------------------ This worm uses the same mechanism as the original Code Red worm to infect vulnerable servers. That is, the worm looks for IIS servers that have not patched the unchecked buffer vulnerability in idq.dll or removed the ISAPI script mappings. See the Code Red Patch FAQ at http://www.incidents.org/react/code_red.php for information on patching systems to remove the vulnerability. Except for using the buffer overflow mechanism in order to get the worm code executed on a vulnerable IIS server, this new worm is entirely different from the original Code Red CRv1 and CRv2 variants. Note: According to eEye, the worm code will be successfully executed only on a Win2000 system running a vulnerable IIS server, WinNT-based IIS servers will simply crash when attempting to execute the worm code. Our experiments and reports received from users confirm this finding. BACKDOOR -------- The most damaging property of this new worm is that the worm creates a back door on an infected server, leaving the system wide open to any attacker. The worm copies %windir%\CMD.EXE to the following locations: c:\inetpub\scripts\root.exe c:\progra~1\common~1\system\MSADC\root.exe d:\inetpub\scripts\root.exe d:\progra~1\common~1\system\MSADC\root.exe This provides a means for a remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the compromised server. In addition, the worm creates a trojan copy of explorer.exe as described below. Due to the actions of the trojan explorer.exe, IIS will make the C: and D: root directories accessible to a remote attacker even if the root.exe command shell program is removed from the scripts and msadc directories. TROJAN EXPLORER.EXE -------------------- The worm carries its own copy of explorer.exe. The worm places its own copy of explorer.exe at c:\explorer.exe and d:\explorer.exe. By placing the trojan file in these locations, Windows will find and run the trojan rather than the real explorer.exe because of the way Windows seaches for executables by default. Specifically, unless the system has been patched against the "Relative Shell Path" vulnerability, the trojan explorer.exe will be executed when the next user logs into the system. (See http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS00-052.asp) Upon execution, the trojan first runs the real explorer.exe (thus the user will not notice any problems) and then goes on to modify the system registry as outlined below. First, the trojan program adds the value SFCDisable=0xFFFFFF9D to HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Winlogin. This registry setting completely disables the Windows File Protection (WFP) mechanism. WFP prevents the replacement of certain monitored system files. See the following for more info: http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q222/1/93.ASP Next, the trojan sets the following "Virtual Roots" in the registry: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W3SVC\Parameters\Virtual Roots \scripts to ,,217 SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W3SVC\Parameters\Virtual Roots \msadc to ,,217 These "217" settings ensure that the scripts and msadc directories (which contain the root.exe copy of cmd.exe) have read/write/execute permission. Finally the trojan sets these two "Virtual Root" values as well: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W3SVC\Parameters\Virtual Roots\c to c:\,,217 SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\W3SVC\Parameters\Virtual Roots\d to d:\,,217 These mappings, which do not normally exist, map the root C: and D: drives to a place where IIS can find them, namely /c and /d. The permissions here are also set to read/write/execute. Quoting eEye's analysis, the purpose of these mappings are described: -------- Basically the above code creates a virtual web path (/c and /d) which maps /c to c:\ and /d to d:\. The writer of this worm has put in this functionality to allow for a backdoor to be placed on the system so even if you remove the root.exe (cmd.exe prompt) from your /scripts folder an attacker can still use the /c and /d virtual roots to compromise your system. The attacks would basically look like: http://IpAddress/c/inetpub/scripts/root.exe?/c+dir (if root.exe was still there) or: http://IpAddress/c/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir (Where dir could be any command an attacker would want to execute). ---------- Note that the trojan explorer.exe need only be executed once for these registry changes to be made. Thus, all the backdoors are enabled, and continue to be enabled, forever after, regardless of whether or not explorer.exe is running. To emphasize, note that even killing the trojan explorer.exe process will not remove the back doors. Further, even killing the explorer.exe process and removing the copies of root.exe and deleting the registry settings will not eliminate the backdoors. If the trojan explorer.exe is executed again (e.g. when the next person logs in), the registry settings will be reinstated, making the C: and D: drives again externally accessible. Finally, note that even deleting the registry settings, removing the copies of root.exe, and removing the trojan explorer.exe is not sufficient to clean the system. During the time the system was backdoored any other attacker could have installed new backdoors that are not associated with this worm. The trojan process sleeps most of the time, but wakes to loop through these registry key modification steps every 10 minutes. This way, even if an administrator notices the registry settings and deletes them, the trojan will reinstate the settings a few minutes later. PROPAGATION ----------- How aggressively the worm attempts to propagate itself depends on whether or not Chinese is the language installed on the system. If Chinese, the worm creates 600 threads and attempts to spread for 48 hours. If non-Chinese, the worm creates 300 threads and attempts to spread for 24 hours. After the infection-spreading interval, the system is forcibly rebooted. The reboot flushes the memory resident worm, and leaves the backdoors and the explorer.exe trojan in place. TARGET SELECTION ----------------- The 300 or 600 worm threads all work simultaneously to propagate the infection. Each chooses a random target IP and then uses one of the following masks with the given probabilities.The masked parts of the IP are replaced with the host computer's own IP information. Thus, the worm mostly confines its targeting to IP addresses close to the host computer's own. 0.0.0.0 (probability 12.5%) => random 255.0.0.0 (probability 50.0%) => same class A 255.255.0.0 (probability 37.5%) => same class B Target IPs which are excluded are 127.x.x.x and 224.x.x.x, and no octet is allowed to be 0 or 255. In addition, the host will not attempt to re-infect itself. INFECTION PROCESS ----------------- Before each attempt to connect to a new target, the worm checks the local time to see if the year is less than 2002 and if the month is less than 10. If either of these checks return false, then the worm ceases the propagation cycle and reboots the server. Note that this implies that all worms will cease propagating by Oct. 1, 2001. To aid performance, the worm uses a nonblocking socket to connect to each target. Specifically this means that if one thread is stuck waiting for a slow connection to a particular target, the wait will not slow down the rest of the threads from continuing their scanning function. After making a successful connection with a target (the three way handshake has completed), the worm thread uploads all of the worm code at once, looks for an acknowledgement, and then moves on to attempting to infect other hosts. When a worm first arrives on a target and begins execution, the worm checks to see if the host has already been infected, and if so, disables itself. Specifically, the worm checks to see a CodeRedII atom has been placed using "GlobalFindAtomA". If the worm finds that the atom exists then it goes to sleep forever. If the CodeRedII atom does not exist, the worm creates the atom and continues execution. DOWNLOADS --------- Corecode provides a .zip file containing a IDA Pro project file and a plaintext disassembly for both the worm and the trojan explorer.exe at: http://www.eikon.tum.de/~simons/ida_root/ To download the eEye analysis and their disassembly files: http://www.eeye.com/html/advisories/coderedII.zip The worm binary can be found at the Unixwiz site: http://www.unixwiz.net/techtips/CodeRedII.html REFERENCES ----------- Corecode's Analysis: http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/incidents/2001-08/0092.html NAI's Analysis: http://vil.nai.com/vil/virusChar.asp?virus_k=99177 eEye's Analysis: http://www.eeye.com/html/advisories/coderedII.zip SecurityFocus Analysis: http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2001-08/0066.html ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ----------------- We are very grateful to Jesper Johansson for reviewing this report and providing many helpful suggestions and technical details. Many thanks are due to corecode, who stayed up all night and provided the very first analysis of the worm binary to the public. We'd also like to recognize Stephen Friedl of Unixwiz for performing a higher level analysis last night and posting his findings to the web before any other concrete information was available. Also, we thank Matt Scarborough for testing the worm on WinNT to confirm that these systems crash rather than running worm code successfully. -- _________________________________________________________________ Steve Gibson, at work on: < a million loose ends > [Fwd: Complete Analysis of CodeRedII]Aug 8, 2001, 5:12am
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You won't believe but %95 of those infected machines running IIS probably without the knowledge of the machine's owner! They have no webpages at all - just the standard "Under construction" default from MS.
Most likely those ppl installed W2K without disabling the IIS install (it is installed by default). Of course they don't care about any security advisory (MS patches, etc) so it is easy to infect them. Thanks to M$ to make "secure" OSs :(( > > Actually this is an interesting snippet from my server log. I dunno if > someone has been trying to attack me with CodeRed or what, but what I DO > know is that www.worm.com does NOT look very promising... > <snip CodeRed V1> This was the CodeRed 1 trying to infect you. The IP you received this request is an already infected machine. Andras [Fwd: Complete Analysis of CodeRedII]Aug 8, 2001, 9:26am
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Try to open his IP in your web browser :)
> > EEW! get it off!!!!!! ;-) I wonder who it was... Your log should contain the requestor's IP. The fellow who wanted to infect you has no clue about it! This worm spread without human intervention. Andras Whipped...Aug 13, 2001, 4:36am
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Could you extend the banning period for a lifetime for this Lonezeri jerk please???
Thanks, Andras Whipped...Aug 13, 2001, 11:29am
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Proof please! You don't just go out accusing someone of lying!
> They seem to lie on the uni stats page, AW doesn't have over one and a half million > users, That is NOT a lie. If you add all the citizens who once registered - you'll end up around 300,000 users just by those numbers (yes - I deducted the "VIP" accounts and so the free cits coming with world's purchase.) Add all those turists (appr. 500,000+) who visited at least one world and you get a much higher number. They never stated that all of their users are still ACTIVE users! > so why shouldn't they lie a bit more to get solidarity from the > community, huh? Did you ever hear the word "integrity"? > I'm just pointing out a possibility, Possibilities with no underlying facts are just rumours. I thought in their country there is still a law to consider someone innocent until proved guilty. > maybe you want me to > flame you everytime you point out something similar, huh??? man, I was just > being honest, unlike you obviously! Looks like I have to call you a liar :) > > KAH > > Object totalAug 25, 2001, 12:57am
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Search results for earliest built object:
Citizen: 106479 Location: 1343N 998W 0a (Teleport) (View Map) Built: October 18, 1996, 5:09 pm (Eastern Time) Model: street1.rwx Description: "Andras's bumpy street" Total search time: 3.8157 seconds. You have built 1,083 objects in AlphaWorld. Not bad considering I'm not a builder :) Andras Size of a CommunityAug 23, 2001, 6:04pm
COMMUNITY WARNINGSep 11, 2001, 4:16am
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You are mixing apples and oranges. The mentioned AV software is just as good as their signature files. None of them has the StockQuote Bot and none of it detects it's presence.
OTOH ZA deals with the action of the programs and it detects the trojan in action if properly configured. If you allow only the AW ports access for a bot the only way it can leak info is through chat or whisper. No telegrams can sent from a bot and for file transfer or email the bot will be blocked because different ports required to do those actions. Chris, If AW Ear wants to access the internet (i.e. leak some data from your puter) ZA will ask you. I see no justified action which requires internet access for AW Ear so just simply block it. So the answer to your question is YES - ZA will PROTECT you despite insanity's comment. Andras > [View Quote] COMMUNITY WARNINGSep 12, 2001, 6:53pm
html posting???Sep 11, 2001, 3:53pm
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Do you think we plan to move to the US? Or do you think only americans has internet? tsk tsk tsk :((
Andras Telegram from AlphaBit Phalpha!Sep 16, 2001, 5:09pm
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I promise JFK: If you start your bull* on my NG with falsely accusing ppl, I'll ban you forever!!
Enough is enough!!! Andras Telegram from AlphaBit Phalpha!Sep 17, 2001, 6:12pm
The page you are attempting to access has been removed
because it violated Angelfire's Terms of Service. Click here to read our Terms of Service To report a violation of our Terms of Service, click here It worked :) [View Quote] test postSep 17, 2001, 2:16pm
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Sending 32 lines for a measle single line junk - tsk tsk tsk
Andras Grand Opening of the Stuff-X eStoreSep 25, 2001, 5:58am
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Thank you very much for your cooperation!
Andras |